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Algorithms in Criminal Justice
When contempt and mistrust too often characterize public attitudes toward lawful




A common criticism of  the use of  algorithms in criminal justice is that algorithms and their
determinations are in some sense ‘opaque’—that is, difficult or impossible to understand, whether
because of  their complexity or because of  intellectual property protections. Scholars have noted
some key problems with opacity, including that opacity can mask unfair treatment and threaten
public accountability. In this paper, we explore a different but related concern with algorithmic
opacity, which centers on the role of  public trust in grounding the legitimacy of  criminal justice
institutions. We argue that algorithmic opacity threatens the trustworthiness of  criminal justice
institutions, which in turn threatens their legitimacy. We first offer an account of  institutional
trustworthiness before showing how opacity threatens to undermine an institution’s trustworthiness.
We then explore how threats to trustworthiness affect institutional legitimacy. Finally, we offer some
policy recommendations to mitigate the threat to trustworthiness posed by the opacity problem.
1: Introduction
In 2013, Eric Loomis was convicted of  eluding the police, a charge stemming from his role in a
drive-by shooting incident in La Crosse, Wisconsin. During sentencing, the judge consulted a
computer program called the Correctional Offender Management Profile for Alternative Sanctions
(usually called by its acronym “COMPAS”) , which calculates the risk that a given defendant will
reoffend. COMPAS found that Loomis presented a high risk of  reoffending. Having consulted this
finding, the judge sentenced Loomis to six years in prison. Loomis appealed his sentence on the
grounds that because COMPAS’s methodology for generating risk assessments is a trade secret,
using COMPAS violated his right to due process. In particular, Loomis claimed that he was denied
his right to an individualized sentence and to be sentenced by an accurate and reliable
decision-making process (State v. Loomis 2016). Loomis’s appeal made its way to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, which upheld his sentence.
1 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Special Message to the Congress on Crime in America,” February 6, 1967, as quoted in Matt
Stroud. 2019. Thin Blue Lie: The Failure of  High-TechPolicing Metropolitan Books: New York.
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Courts and law enforcement agencies across the U.S., as well as certain other countries,
employ predictive algorithms for a variety of  purposes, including risk assessment in sentencing,
predicting locations where crime is likely to occur, and identifying those likely to commit criminal
acts in the near future. Much of  the focus on the use of  predictive algorithms has concerned their
legality. This, after all, was the basis of  Loomis’s appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. But
predictive algorithms have also faced ethical criticism as well. The two most widespread criticisms
are that the algorithms are biased against or unfair to people of  color (Barocas and Selbst 2016; Lum
and Isaac 2016; Selbst 2017) and that the algorithmic predictions are for various reasons “opaque,”
unintelligible, or incomprehensible to human subjects (Burrell 2016; O’Neil 2016). There is no
consensus definition of  algorithmic opacity, but we understand an algorithm to count as opaque to
some degree just in case (a) facts about the contribution of  any single feature of  the world to the
algorithm’s final determination cannot be easily accessed, either by the human decision-maker or by
persons affected by the determination, or (b) the way that the algorithmic determination figures in
decision-making cannot be easily understood. We are not here concerned with providing a complete
conceptual analysis of ALGORITHMIC OPACITY. We offer this definition because it is attractively broad,
because it allows for diverse sources of  opacity (several of  which we outline below in Section 3), and
because it is consonant with the definitions used by other scholars in the field (de Laat 2018; Watson
and Floridi 2020). A person might be ignorant of  thecontribution that a feature of  the world makes
to an algorithmic system’s determinations because of  the system’s innate complexity, because the
person lacks specialist knowledge, or because the source code is protected as intellectual property as
a trade secret. And even when an individual knows how an algorithmic system works, they might
remain ignorant of  the role its determinations play in institutional decision-making if  that role is not
disclosed by decision-makers. We are interested in all of  these sources of  opacity, and our definition
captures all of  them.
Two moral and legal concerns with opacity are well established. Opacity can mask unfair
treatment, and it can threaten public accountability. If  we cannot knowhow some decision about a
defendant’s pretrial detention has been made, because the algorithm’s mechanism for generating a
risk score is opaque, then we cannot know whether we were treated unfairly in the rendering of  that
decision (Barocas and Selbst 2016). It is also challenging to hold the algorithm or its designers
“accountable” for its determinations if  an explanation is impossible to secure (Vestby and Vestby
2019; Wachter et al. 2018).
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In this paper we raise a novel moral concern with algorithmic opacity, one that arises from the
relationship between algorithmic opacity and the trustworthiness of  criminal justice institutions. In
particular, we argue that algorithmic opacity can undermine the trustworthiness of  criminal
justice institutions, which threatens their legitimacy. This problem can persist even when
predictive algorithms satisfy reasonable standards of  fairness and when they are more accurate than
humans in the same domain.
Section 2 offers a discussion of  the nature of  trust and trustworthiness, both as these concepts
figure in interpersonal relationships and as they figure in the relationship between citizens and the
institution of  law enforcement. We offer an account of  institutional trustworthiness according to
which trustworthy institutions are competent to do what they are entrusted with doing, but they are
also arranged so as to ensure that the institution will function as it has been entrusted to do. We further
suggest that a fully trustworthy institution will signal its competence and responsiveness to the needs
of  those who count on it.
In section 3 we describe several sources of  algorithmic opacity, andin section 4 we argue that
algorithmic opacity undermines the trustworthiness of  criminal justice institutions along several
dimensions. In section 5 we show that a threat to trustworthiness is morally problematic because
there is a morally significant link between trust in and the trustworthiness of  a law enforcement
institution and its legitimacy: as trust and trustworthiness erodes, that institution’s claim to legitimacy
weakens. Algorithmic opacity, then, threatens the very legitimacy of  the institution of  law
enforcement.2
2: Trust and Trustworthiness
Trust and distrust are attitudes, whereas trustworthiness is  the property that makes an attitude of
trust rational or fitting. Typically, trustworthiness is a property attributed to individuals. We might
trust our spouses, our teachers, our priests, or our physicians, and we trust them because we believe
they are trustworthy. In developing an account of  trust and trustworthiness that applies to the
relationship between individuals and institutions, it can therefore be instructive to first explore
plausible accounts of  trust and trustworthiness concerning relationships between individuals.
2 It is worth flagging here that an apparent implication of  our view is that an institution can be in fact trustworthy, and
yet citizens do not trust it (for whatever reason), and therefore its legitimacy is undermined. Thus, the same institution
could be both trustworthy and illegitimate. Some might find this to be an odd conclusion; however, we think this is
correct, and offer the resources for understanding why in section 5 below..
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Annette Baier, in her influential article “Trust and Antitrust” characterizes trust between
individuals as accepted dependence on the good will of  another. She writes, “When I trust another, I
depend on her good will toward me…Trust then, on this first approximation, is accepted
vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or lack of  good will) toward one” (Baier
1986, p. 235). Much more can be said to unpack Baier’s characterization of  trust, but it is plausible
enough on its face. What is most insightful about Baier’s analysis is that trust or distrust are attitudes
that figure in relationships of  vulnerability on the part of  one individual to the choices of  another.
But Baier does not provide conditions that make trust rational or fitting. Those conditions are given
by an account of  trustworthiness.
Karen Jones, expanding on Annette Baier’s earlier work, develops a “three-place” account of
trustworthiness.
Three-place trustworthiness: B is trustworthy with respect to A in domain of  interaction
D, if  and only if  she iscompetent with respect to that domain, and she would take the fact
that A is counting on her, were A to do so in this domain, to be a compelling reason for
acting as counted on (Jones 2012, pp. 70–71).3
On Jones’s account, when one person counts on--i.e., accepts their vulnerability to--another person
in some domain, the party being counted on is trustworthy if  and only if  they are competent to do
what they are being counted on to do and they possess certain motivations to act as counted on.
Returning to Baier’s initial quote, counting on or depending on someone in a domain entails that one
is vulnerable to the individual’s choices in that domain. A professor’s students count on them to
grade their work impartially. This does not entail that students trust their professors to grade
impartially. One might be unhappily vulnerable to someone’s choices if  they do not trust them.
Trustworthiness requires competence. A teacher would be a less trustworthy evaluator of  their
students’ work in a philosophy course if  their graduate degree was in an unrelated field, because they
would lack competence to do the job. And finally Jones thinks that being trustworthy requires being
motivated to act as counted on by the fact that one is being counted on to act that way.
Trustworthiness is therefore incompatible with, say, a person acting as counted on merely out of  fear
of  punishment. A person would not be a fully trustworthy teacher if  their motivation to grade their
students’ work impartially was that they feared being caught. If, on the other hand, one is motivated
3 Emphasis added.
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by good will toward one’s students or conscientiousness concerning their pedagogical duties, they
are a more trustworthy evaluator. What all trustworthy motivational states share, according to Jones,
is that they involve seeing the fact of  someone else’s dependence on you as a direct and compelling
reason to act on their behalf. Something like Jones’s account is widely accepted among trust
theorists.4
Jones provides an attractive set of  necessary and sufficient conditions for trustworthiness in
reciprocal interpersonal relationships (e.g. friends, romantic partners), certain fiduciary or advisory
roles (e.g. personal advisors, spiritual leaders), and so forth. But does it make sense to apply an
account of  interpersonal trustworthiness to institutions, including the criminal justice institutions
that are the focus of  this paper? To make progress on this question, we will consider whether it is
sensible to devise an institutional analogue of  each of  Jones’s three conditions—the idea of  counting
on another, the competence requirement, and the motivational requirement—to criminal justice
institutions.
2.1 The Dependence Requirement
For Jones’s account to be suitable for application to the relationship between citizens and
criminal justice institutions, there must first be some domain in which citizens “count on” or depend
on those institutions. What do citizens count on law enforcement and the courts to do?
It will suffice here to note that there is at least one domain in which citizens count on
criminal justice institutions in virtue of  those institutions’ possessing a monopoly on the domestic
use of  force. This monopoly comprises a number of  different methods, from the use of  lethal force
in threatening scenarios to the restriction of  liberty via detainment, compelled presence and
disclosure, and incarceration. We assume for the purposes of  the paper that this monopoly on force,
and the methods that comprise it, exist for the purpose of  promoting peace, security, and justice.5
But whatever its purpose, the fact that this monopoly exists means that citizens count on criminal
justice institutions for peace, security, and justice; they have no feasible option other than to rely on
5 By “justice” we mean at least equal treatment of  citizens regardless of  one’s constitutionally protected characteristics
like race, sex, and religion. Aside from this, we do not assume any substantive account of  justice. By making this
assumption we are therefore setting aside recent structural criticisms of  law enforcement according to which the
function of  law enforcement in the United States is to surveil and oppress poor people of  color. If  that criticism is
sound, we are confident that our account of  trustworthiness will yield the correct conclusion that American law
enforcement is not trustworthy, because it is not responsive to the needs of  citizens who are counting on it.
4 Influential trust scholar Russell Hardin and coauthors defend a similar account (Cook et al. 2005).
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criminal justice institutions to secure those ends on their behalf. Taking security into one’s own
hands is not a feasible alternative to the rule of  law, administered by the state.
2.2 The Competence Requirement
The competence requirement of  Jones’s account of  trustworthiness also seems to be
applicable to institutions. Criminal justice institutions can be more or less competent at promoting
the ends of  peace, security, and justice. The competence of  our criminal justice institutions at
achieving these aims will vary along a number of  dimensions, including the efficacy of  investigational
tools, the soundness of  strategic decision-making, the talent of  the individuals acting in their official
capacity on behalf  of  the institutions, the efficacy of  mechanisms for ensuring compliance with
institutional norms, the reliability of  the procedures for the gathering and evaluation of  evidence,
and institutional superiority with respect to the threat of  force. Some will be tempted by a
deflationary explanation of  institutional competence according to which the competence of  the
institution is nothing more than the competence of  its officials. We resist this view on the grounds
that some of  the dimensions of  institutional competence do not lend themselves to the deflationary
explanation. For example, institutional mechanisms designed to ensure compliance with institutional
norms and policies can be more or less effective at ensuring compliance. In one of  the most
shocking examples of  law enforcement corruption in the past 40 years, The Los Angeles Police
Department’s Rampart scandal involved as many as 70 sworn officers being implicated in various
illegal activities including stealing and selling cocaine from evidence lockers. A key finding of  the
LAPD’s internal inquiry into the scandal was that inadequate supervisory mechanisms existed to
ensure compliance with departmental policies (Parks 2000). The Rampart Scandal was not a failure
of individual competence but rather a failure of  the institutional arrangements for ensuring that officers
acted as they were being counted on to act. The inadequacy of  these institutional arrangements
would have undermined the LAPD’s institutional competence even if  the Rampart scandal had not
occurred.
2.3 The Motivational Requirement
The motivational requirement for three-place trustworthiness poses the greatest challenge to
adapting Jones’s account of  interpersonal trustworthiness to institutions. If  being trustworthy
requires taking the fact of  another’s dependence to be a reason to act as counted on, then being
trustworthy seems to require the possession of  a capacity to respond to facts as reasons.
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It is at best unclear whether institutions possess such a capacity and hence whether they can
take the fact of  someone else’s dependency as a direct and compelling reason to act. Individual
members of  an institution possess this capacity, andso can be more or less trustworthy, but, perhaps,
institutions cannot.6 Karen Cook, Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi in their book Cooperation
Without Trust? deny that citizens can reasonably trust institutions precisely because institutions do
not possess motivations, and citizens lack sufficient familiarity with members of  institutions to have
access to their motivations. They write,
[To secure certain goals] we might need only the sporadic services of  professionals,
business representatives, scientists, and many others, but these are people whom we
could not trust [...] because we cannot monitor them and do not have repeated
interactions with them...Hence, we want devices that are de facto alternatives to
trustworthiness to align their interests with our own. (Cook et al. 2005, p. 104)
This quote suggests that no institutions are worthy of  our trust because: (a) trusting an
institution is nothing more than trusting its members, and (b) we cannot trust the members of  an
institution because we are not directly familiar with their behavior and motives. This skeptical
account is in tension with our ordinary practices, which suggest that institutions can be more or less
trustworthy, apart from the motivations of  their members. It is commonplace to speak of  “trusting”
or “distrusting” institutions, especially medicine, media, academia, and law enforcement in spite of
the fact that most people have little access to the motivations of  the members of  the institutions
(Jackson and Bradford 2010; Tyler and Huo 2002).
Ordinary practice might be mistaken, but, ideally, an account of  institutional trustworthiness
could vindicate these ordinary attributions of  trustworthiness to institutions. With some simple
modifications, Jones’s three-place account can be adapted to institutions, and this can be done
without attributing to institutions the capacity to take facts as reasons. We propose the following
account:
Institutional three-place trustworthiness: An institution I is trustworthy with respect to a
subject S in domain of  interaction D, if  and only if  I is competent with respect to D, and I is
6 What we say about institutions having motivations will depend on complex issues of  group agency, which we do not
have the space or need to discuss. See (Pettit 2009; Pettit and List 2011; Tuomela 2013) for important work in this area.
7
non-accidentally responsive to the fact that S is counting on I, were S to do so in this
domain, such that I functions as counted on.
What does it mean for an institution to be non-accidentally responsive to the fact that a person is
counting on it in some domain? A view suggested by the Cook, Hardin, and Levi quote is that
institutional responsiveness is entirely determined by the responsiveness of  its constituent members.
For an institution to be responsive to the fact of  a subject’s dependence is just for its members to be
responsive to the fact of  the subject’s dependence. But we have already resisted that view above. For
it seems that an institution can be trustworthy—and trusted—even when the subjects of  its
authority have little knowledge of  the motivations of  its members. Instead, we propose that an
institution is non-accidentally responsive to the fact that others are counting on it in some domain if
the institution’s mechanisms, operations, and incentive structure have been successfully designed for
the purpose of  ensuring that, to some satisfactory degree, representatives of  the institution will act as
counted on qua representatives of  the institution.7 Institutional responsiveness to others’
dependence, then, is non-accidental insofar as it is responsive by design.
An institution’s trustworthiness is not merely a function of  the aggregate trustworthiness of
its individual members; the structures in place within the institution, which may exist independently
of  our assessments of  any one individual’s trustworthiness, are also a significant factor in the
trustworthiness of  the institution. Our analysis of  the Rampart Scandal above illustrates this. An
institution that creates an abundance of  opportunities for non-compliance among its officials is less
trustworthy, even if  none of  its officials takes advantage of  those opportunities. A police department
can bolster trustworthiness by supporting a robust internal affairs division, one that reliably
identifies and addresses officer misconduct. A city commission might take this a step further by
making internal affairs a separate agency, external to the police department, and thereby avoiding the
potential conflicts of  interest posed by an in-house program. These measures make the law
enforcement more responsive by design by ensuring that officers act as counted on by citizens
without requiring any fundamental change in officers’ motives, and hence without any fundamental
change in the trustworthiness of  officers.
If  one wishes to maintain that trustworthiness is not a feature that institutions can possess,
then call the concept we describe here “quasi-trustworthiness.” As we attempt to establish below,
7 This last latin term is included so as to make clear that breaches of  trust in the merely personal conduct of  institutional
representatives cannot undermine the institution’s trustworthiness.
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whether we call this feature of  institutions “trustworthiness” proper, or something else, the feature is
relevant to state and institutional legitimacy, and it is threatened by the use of  opaque algorithms in
criminal justice contexts.
2.4 The Evidence Requirement
But we do not yet have a full picture of  what it is for an institution to be fully trustworthy.
Being fully trustworthy requires more than competence and responsiveness--to be worthy of  others’
trust requires that those depending on you have adequate reason to believe that you are competent
and responsive to their needs. Thus Baier writes, “’Trust me!’ is for most of  us an invitation which
we cannot accept at will—either we do already trust the one who says it, in which case it serves at
best as reassurance, or it is properly responded with, ‘Why should and how can I, until I have cause
to?’” (Baier 1986, p. 244).
Jones formalizes what we might call the “evidence requirement” for full trustworthiness as
follows:
B is richly trustworthy with respect to A just in case (i) B is willing and able reliably to signal
to A those domains in which B is competent and will take the fact that A is counting on her,
were A to do so, to be a compelling reason for acting as counted on and (ii) there are at least
some domains in which B will be responsive to the fact of  A’s dependency in the manner
specified in i (Jones 2012, p. 74).
Jones emphasizes the ability and willingness to signal responsiveness and competence. But we suspect
that signaling is but one way to provide evidence that one is responsive and competent. What is key
to achieving full or “rich” trustworthiness is that those who are depending on you have adequate
reason to believe you are competent and responsive to the fact of  their dependence. Signaling is
simply the most obvious way to provide those reasons. To continue with the teaching analogy, one
way to give students reason to believe that one is grading their work impartially is by providing
adequate feedback on their assignments. In addition to acting as guidance for improvement,
providing feedback signals to students that their teacher takes students’ dependence on them
seriously; that the evaluation of  their work is not determined by shifting whims and moods. Failure
to signal in this way undermines a person’s trustworthiness as a teacher.
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If  signaling is typically needed to count as fully trustworthy in the interpersonal case, we see
no reason that it is any less important for institutional trustworthiness. Like individuals, trustworthy
institutions must give citizens reasons to believe that they are competent and responsive to
dependence in the domain in which they are being counted on. Indeed, we will see in section 4 that
signaling competence and responsiveness by criminal justice institutions is particularly important for
the well-being of  the citizens these institutions were designed to protect; peace and security break
down when citizens lack confidence that the police and courts will respond competently and
earnestly to their calls for assistance, follow through with investigations of  criminal wrongdoing
regardless of  a person’s class or race, and judge the merits of  their case impartially and in light of  full
evidence. We are now in a position to give our full account of  institutional trustworthiness:
Rich institutional three-place trustworthiness: An institution I is richly trustworthy with
respect to a subject S in domain of  interaction D, if  and only if  I is competent with respect to
D, I is non-accidentally responsive to the fact that S is counting on I, were S to do so in D,
such that I functions as counted on, and I provides adequate reason for S to believe that I is
competent with respect to D and non-accidentally responsive to the fact that S is counting
on I in D.
3: Forms of  Opacity
Section 2 put in place a framework for understanding the nature of  trust and trustworthiness as it
figures in relationships between citizens and public institutions. In section 3, we describe several
sources of  opacity and the ways in which the opacity of  predictive algorithms can undermine the
trustworthiness of  state institutions.
Recall our earlier definition of  opacity according to which an algorithm counts as opaque
when (a) the contribution of  any single feature of  the world to the algorithm’s final determination
cannot be easily accessed, either by the human decision-maker or by persons affected by the
determination, or (b) the way that the algorithmic determination figures in institutional
decision-making cannot be easily understood. What is key for opacity, then, is that something about
the algorithm itself, or about the context in which the algorithm is implemented, makes it extremely
difficult for an ordinary person to understand how or why it arrives at its determinations, and how
those determinations figure in institutional decision-making. Algorithmic opacity can have several
sources:
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Proprietary Opacity: the algorithm’s code may not be made publicly available because of
intellectual property protections and concerns about competitive advantage.
Technical Opacity: understanding programming languages is a specialized skill, and few
non-programmers are computationally literate in ways that would allow them to understand
why an algorithm makes the determinations that it does.
Fundamental Opacity: the decision procedures of  machine learning algorithms, which
work by a mathematical process of  iterative statistical optimization, resist interpretation in
terms comprehensible to any human (Burrell 2016).
Implementation Opacity: algorithmic systems are often shrouded in secrecy, either on the
grounds that secrecy is important for strategic advantage or because of  concerns about
public attitudes toward them.
3.1 Proprietary Opacity
Many algorithmic systems in use in the criminal justice system are created and maintained by private
technology companies. For example, until very recently, the LAPD used Palantir’s data collection and
analysis program to generate “Chronic Offenders Bulletins” to alert officers to the most dangerous
criminals in a community. The LAPD also made use of  software provided by PredPol, another
private firm, to identify crime hotspots. Plenty of  technology in use in public institutions is used this
way. What makes criminal risk assessment and predictive policing technologies distinctive, however,
is that the algorithms on which these systems rely to generate their predictions are often inaccessible
to those wishing to scrutinize them. As Sarah Brayne puts it:
Private vendors can hide behind trade secrecy and nondisclosure agreements, ultimately
circumventing typical public-sector transparency requirements and lowering police
accountability by making it harder for scholars to study, regulators to regulate, and activists
to mobilize for or against specific practices (Brayne 2020, p. 140).
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Subjects of  criminal justice algorithms have sought to scrutinize the algorithms that were used
against them as part of  their legal defense; yet, the companies that own the technologies are
protected by intellectual property laws, and the courts are unable to grant the accused access to the
algorithms (Wexler 2018, p. 1346). What’s more, even when defendants have reason to believe there
was an error in certain relevant and significant inputs to the program, they are not able to access the
algorithm to prove that it materially affected the resulting assessment. In the case of  one New York
inmate, this meant that due to a non-trivial error in the input data, he was denied parole (Wexler
2018, p. 1354). When algorithms used by the police or courts are protected from scrutiny on the
grounds that the data constitutes proprietary information, the result is a kind of  opacity that not
only frustrates the accused’s ability to verify that their treatment was fair and appropriate, but also
weakens the general public’s ability to have faith in the deployment of  such methods in society more
broadly. This is acute when there are substantial doubts concerning the role of  certain variables, as
was true in the case just noted of  the inmate denied parole despite an error in his input data.
Unlike certain other sources of  opacity to be discussed below, proprietary opacity is not
inherent in the algorithmic system: regulators could simply require that technology companies waive
intellectual property rights when their products are being used by public institutions, at least to allow
the accused and oversight groups to access the algorithms.
3.2 Technical Opacity
Even with full access to an algorithmic system, however, few non-specialists have the statistics or
computer science background needed to understand why a predictive algorithmic system makes the
determinations that it does. Of  course, those with education and experience programming
algorithms could, to some extent, understand the decision-making process employed by the
algorithmic system. But the average person—and, thus, many of  those directly impacted by these
systems—will be incapable of  understanding how the systems work. And this problem would likely
remain even if  those with the relevant expertise attempted to explain or teach those with less
understanding. Thus, technical opacity serves as a barrier to many individuals’ ability to understand
the treatment to which they are subject.
For example, take predictive policing algorithms. Even the officers who use them do not
pretend to understand how or why they make the predictions they do. Sarah Brayne witnessed this
ignorance by command officers first-hand while embedded with the LAPD. She writes, “Asked to
explain how PredPol works, one captain replied that it ‘involves a mathematical equation I know
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nothing about’” (Brayne 2020, p. 87). For this reason, many officers are skeptical of  the algorithms’
utility (Brayne 2020, p. 87). If  these systems are technically opaque to the officers using them, they
certainly are opaque to the average citizen.8
3.3 Fundamental Opacity
While technical opacity concerns the average person’s inability to comprehend how the algorithm
reaches its assessment, there is a further, deeper kind of  opacity, which we call fundamental opacity.
This kind of  opacity results from the fact that the decision procedures of  machine learning
algorithms, which work by a mathematical process of  iterative statistical optimization, are
extraordinarily complex (Burrell 2016). The resulting systems are the product of  many different
individuals working relatively independently, using a variety of  technical skills and programming
techniques. Thus, it is not only that the average person cannot understand such algorithms; even the
best trained experts cannot, on their own, understand them.
What’s more, as these systems learn and incorporate new data over time, they tend to
become increasingly opaque. This is a function of  any machine learning system, which is
programmed not only on initial data sets, but also how to learn from mistakes, new data, and various
other commands. The promise of  such systems is that they will improve over time; however, with
this improvement comes an ever-increasing opacity. Beyond a certain point, the ‘mind’ of  such an
algorithm can evolve to be so extraordinarily complex that even the best human minds
together—even those responsible for its initial programming—could not understand it.
3.4 Implementation Opacity
In addition to the three sources of  opacity stemming from features of  predictive policing systems
themselves, the way that certain criminal justice institutions—most notably, police
departments—implement those systems can be hidden from the public. Implementation opacity, then,
concerns the relative inability of  individuals subject to algorithmic assessments to understand the
role that these assessments play in decisions that affect their lives. Brayne reports encountering
several instances where LAPD officers would deny her access to information about how an
8 To be sure, this sort of  technical opacity is pervasive throughout our lives. Most of  us do not understand, and are not
capable of  understanding, how MRI machines, GPS, encryption software, pharmaceuticals, or even computers work. But
in many such cases, the technical opacity of  such resources does not pose a problem for our treatment by criminal justice
institutions, where fair treatment is a constitutive aim and the right to due process a central feature. Thus, while technical
opacity is not unique to the use of  algorithms in criminal justice, it does pose a special and urgent problem in that
domain.
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algorithmic system works on this basis (Brayne 2020, p. 93). In the courts system, many defendants
are surprised to learn that their sentences will be influenced by an algorithm. In other areas of
government, citizens are shocked and dismayed to learn that their well being, access to social
services, and livelihoods are determined in part by algorithms (Eubanks 2017). Like proprietary
opacity, implementation opacity can be remedied through public disclosure, yet it remains pervasive
and persistent.
We have surveyed four sources of  opacity arising from the use of  computer algorithms in
criminal justice. We will now illustrate some of  the ways that these sources of  opacity can undermine
the trustworthiness of  criminal justice institutions.
4. Opacity and Trustworthiness
4.1 Signaling Responsiveness and Masking Discrimination:
To understand how opacity undermines trustworthiness, we must first describe a separate concern
that some scholars and activists have raised for predictive policing. According to this concern
predictive policing systems will be (or are being) used to both mask and reinforce discriminatory
policing practices. Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst put the general worry about masking succinctly:
[D]ecision makers could knowingly and purposefully bias the collection of  data to
ensure that mining suggests rules that are less favorable to members of  protected
classes. They could likewise attempt to preserve the known effects of  prejudice in
prior decision making by insisting that such decisions constitute a reliable and
impartial set of  examples from which to induce a decision-making rule. (Barocas and
Selbst 2016, p. 692).
When data collection and labeling practices are not disclosed by criminal justice agencies, the
prospect of  biased data collection looms large. Few algorithms used in decision-making by police or
the courts use race as a factor in making their determinations. The determinations of  those
algorithms therefore appear to be race neutral. But appearances can be misleading. An agency that
uses that system might knowingly or unknowingly make classifications based on data tainted by prior
discriminatory behavior. For example, arrest data appear race-neutral but might be racially skewed by
explicit or implicit prejudice in decision-making by police officers. Those who intend to engage in
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racially discriminatory practices can thus mask biases in the algorithmic system  by appealing to its
“race-blind” decision-making procedure.
Now suppose that a watchdog group wanted to determine whether, say, a given predictive
policing system was being used in this way. Proprietary, technical, fundamental, and implementation
opacity converge to make it next to impossible for the watchdog group to investigate the data
collection and labeling methods involved in the training of  the system. It is not merely the absence
of  publicly available training or output data that makes investigation impossible. It is that conducting
such an investigation requires knowledge of  advanced statistical techniques that few possess. Thus,
opacity enables discrimination masking.
In a case like this, one moral concern is discrimination itself. But the mere prospect of
discrimination masking, made possible by opaque algorithmic systems, also undermines the
trustworthiness of  law enforcement agencies. Remember that a key feature of  institutional
trustworthiness is the ability and willingness of  an institution to signal its responsiveness to the fact
that citizens are counting on it. By making discrimination masking a live possibility, the opacity of
algorithmic systems calls into question our criminal justice institutions’ responsiveness to the needs
of  some citizens. At the same time, the opacity of  algorithmic systems compromises the ability of
criminal justice institutions to signal responsiveness to need by demonstrating that no discrimination
masking is taking place; indeed, it suggests not just an inability but an unwillingness of  the institution
to properly signal its trustworthiness. Therefore, the very prospect of  discrimination masking, made
possible by opacity, undermines the trustworthiness of  criminal justice institutions. Trustworthiness
is especially compromised for Black Americans who have antecedent reasons to suspect
discriminatory conduct by police agencies. Importantly, this loss of  trustworthiness can occur even if
masking is not in fact taking place. To signal responsiveness, and to preserve trustworthiness in the
face of  algorithmic opacity, law enforcement agencies need a mechanism by which they can “show
their work” with respect to the operation of  predictive algorithmic systems and the role these
systems play in strategic operations. More on this in the concluding section.
At this point one might contend that access to the inner workings of  the algorithmic system
is not needed to determine whether using the system is discriminatory or otherwise unfair. Rather, it
might be sufficient simply to inspect the outputs of  such a system. For instance, if  you want to know
whether a predictive policing system is discriminatory you can see what the outcomes are across
various relevant racial groups. And none of  this requires any particular knowledge of  the inner
workings of  the algorithm itself.
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If  discrimination or unfairness can be addressed without overcoming opacity, then we have
overstated the threat to trustworthiness that opacity poses. But addressing discrimination without
overcoming opacity assumes that we can identify sources of  unfairness simply by evaluating the
outcomes an algorithmic system produces. This works well enough when the fairness at stake is
statistical in the sense that it concerns the distribution of  beneficial and burdensome outputs across
the population. But other fairness concerns cannot be addressed without knowing more about the
algorithmic system. Discrimination, at least in part, depends upon treatment. That is, in addition to
whether outcomes are unequal or suggestive of  discrimination, it also matters whether individuals’
interests were not equally considered, discounted, or other relevant constraints were violated in the
process leading to a determination. And, crucially, this is something that cannot be understood
merely by looking at outcomes: we need to understand how the outcomes were produced, which
requires access to the inner workings of  the algorithm. For example, Deborah Hellman has recently
argued that the use of  certain factors by an algorithmic system in the rendering of  an output can
constitute “compounded injustice” for those affected by the output. Hellman describes the concern
very clearly,
Accurate data on base rate differences may result from prior injustice. For example, suppose
that low educational attainment is predictive of  recidivism. And suppose that blacks are more
likely to have left school early because the schools they attended were inferior. If  an
algorithm uses educational attainment to predict recidivism, it may use the fact that blacks
were unfairly treated in the past to justify treating them worse today. This is the problem I
term “compounding injustice”(Hellman 2020, p. 841)
Compounding injustice seems to occur as a result of  a certain causal relationship between prior
injustice and present mistreatment. It is therefore very difficult to know whether an algorithmic
system is compounding injustice unless we know some detail about the factors used in rendering the
decision. According to Hellman’s proposal , if  those factors are both the product of, and aggravating
of, past injustice, then their use is unfair on the grounds that it compounds a prior injustice. Opacity
poses a serious informational obstacle to those who wish to know whether an algorithmic system
compounds injustice.
4.2 Opacity, Competence, and Signaling:
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Algorithmic opacity also threatens institutional trustworthiness by eroding the competence of  both
the law enforcement institution itself  and those officials tasked with carrying out its mandate by
reducing the expertise of  these officials. Increasingly, officials are encouraged or required to rely on
and comply with the assessments of  algorithmic systems, in lieu of  relying on their own professional
expertise. Indeed, the algorithmic systems are largely intended to override whatever expertise the
individual official has. What’s more, these systems do not easily allow their methods or findings to be
incorporated into a given official’s expertise or skill set. Thus, rather than supplementing officials’
expertise, these systems are an obstacle to expertise.
One might claim that diminished expertise on the part of  officials is counterbalanced by the
increase in competence at the institutional level. That is, the institution of  law enforcement (or the
criminal justice system more broadly) is more competent on balance thanks to the use of  algorithmic
systems, even if  individual officers are less competent. The promise of  such systems, after all, is that
they decrease bias and error and increase the ability of  officials to anticipate future criminal activity.
It stands to reason, then, that this could produce a net gain in institutional competence. Relatedly, it
might also be claimed that the implementation of  algorithmic systems displays a higher-order
institutional competence, which involves recognizing the limitations of  its officials and adopting
alternative methods to satisfy institutional goals. This is ostensibly what the shift to algorithmic
systems aims to achieve.
However, this line of  reasoning rests on several questionable assumptions. First, it is not
obvious that algorithms have increased, on balance, institutional competence. In fact, there is hardly
any evidence that supports the alleged efficacy of  these programs (Boba Santos 2020). Indeed, the
reverse may well be true: while algorithmic systems promise to eliminate bias, there is some
indication that they further entrench biases, and do so in a way that precludes easy resolution
(Angwin et al. 2016; Heaven 2020; McGrory and Bedi 2020; Selbst 2017). Further, there is little
evidence that law enforcement agencies, or the private firms from which they purchase their
predictive policing systems, have sought such evidence—for example, by funding or otherwise
supporting independent research initiatives. This highlights another way institutional trustworthiness
is further eroded by opacity—namely, through the institution’s failure to robustly signal their
competence and responsiveness by embracing only those methods that are empirically sound, and
abandoning those methods that fail to live up to their expectations.
Moreover, for institutions to have a plausible claim to higher-order competence, they must
have clear procedures in place to address the failures of  the algorithmic systems on which they rely.
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This is also essential for signaling institutional competence: without an ability to demonstrate that
mistakes will be ameliorated, those subject to them will have little reason to trust these institutions.
Thus far, however, there has been no clear indication that the institutions deploying these systems
have sought to cultivate robust programs for addressing systematic errors. One reason for this is the
proprietary opacity mentioned above: there is little that police departments can do to investigate the
prospect that an algorithmic system compounds injustice without access to the source code. And
again, even if  theydid have access, technical and fundamental opacity present an obstacle: most
police departments, for example, do not have the staff  or resources, let alone the sophisticated
knowledge and expertise, to understand these errors and to identify ways of  avoiding them.
The foregoing points generate a practical dilemma for many of  the institutions that rely on
this technology. On the one hand, to sustain or improve their trustworthiness, these institutions
ought to seek out ways to mitigate those areas in which their competence is lacking, and may even
opt for as yet unproven but plausible methods when other available alternatives are unlikely to fare
better. Thus, predictive policing and risk assessment algorithms appear to be viable approaches for
promoting trustworthiness. In practice, however, the circumstances in which these methods are
often employed are likely to erode trustworthiness for the many reasons listed above.
5: Trust, Trustworthiness, and Legitimacy
So far, we have argued that algorithmic opacity undermines the trustworthiness of  criminal justice
institutions. But why exactly is a lack of  trustworthiness amoral problem for these institutions? In
this section, we argue that the answer to this question lies in the relationship between institutional
trustworthiness and institutional legitimacy. In making this argument we appeal to two distinct but
related conceptions of  legitimacy. The first,descriptive conception emerges from the social science
literature, and holds that a decline in the trustworthiness of  an institution can cause citizens to
perceive the institution as less legitimate, which reduces compliance and cooperation with the law,
which in turn hurts citizens. On a second, normative conception of  legitimacy, diminished




According to the conception of  legitimacy commonly deployed among social scientists, the
legitimacy of  criminal justice institutions is nothing over and above the attitudes or judgments of
those subject to it (Tyler 2006; Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler and Jackson 2014). We call accounts of
legitimacy that adopt this conception of  legitimacydescriptive, because they are not concerned with
providing a moral justification of  the authority of criminal justice institutions. Rather, their aims are
to specify conditions that cause individuals to have certain attitudes toward criminal justice
institutions and then to investigate how those attitudes influence behavior. One version of  such an
account holds that legitimacy is just “the belief that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements
are appropriate, proper, and just” (Tyler 2006, p. 376). A closely related approach takes institutional
legitimacy to be a function of  individual perceptions of  the institution’s trustworthiness, or
individuals’ subjective attitudes of  trust toward the institution (Tyler and Huo 2002, p. 104). In other
words, an institution is legitimate just in case, and to the extent that, it is trusted, or viewed as
trustworthy, by those subject to it.
Tom Tyler has demonstrated that judgments of  an institution’s legitimacy correlate with both
reported compliance and help-seeking behavior. He finds that “if  people generally viewed legal
authorities as legitimate, they were more likely to indicate that they followed the law in their everyday
lives. They were also more likely to indicate that they sought help from legal authorities in a variety
of  situations ” (Tyler and Huo 2002, p. 106). In other words, an institution that is legitimate—i.e.,
that is trusted, or seen as trustworthy, and thus legitimate—will both secure greater compliance with
its commands, and will be sought out by citizens for assistance, allowing it to better fulfill some of  its
core institutional aims.9
The flipside of  this, however, is also true: evidence from Tyler’s extensive work on
descriptive legitimacy supports the conclusion that to the extent that an institution is not
trusted—and thus, illegitimate in the descriptive sense—there is a similar decline in individuals’
compliance and help-seeking behavior (Tyler and Jackson 2014). Notice that this can (and surely
does) generate the following feedback loop: decreasing legitimacy within a given population causes
lower levels of  compliance and help-seeking behavior by those in that population. The inability to
secure voluntary compliance means it is less capable of  achieving desired outcomes and delivering
on its distinctive mandate. This failure gives rise to a further decrease in legitimacy, as individuals
9 But see (Hawdon 2008) who questions the direct link between perceptions of  trustworthiness by the public and
perceptions of  legitimacy. Hawdon’s skepticism is, in part, due to the assumption that trust is an attitude that takes
individuals as its object, and so it is a category mistake to talk of  trusting institutions. In section 2 we argued that this
assumption is mistaken.
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find themselves less trusting of  a less capable institution. And the cycle starts anew. Declining
descriptive legitimacy therefore negatively affects the institution’s ability to achieve the aims that
define the institution, which in turn erodes trust and confidence.
Declining descriptive institutional legitimacy can lead to a decline in the trustworthiness of
the institution. This result may seem paradoxical, but it follows naturally from the account of
institutional trustworthiness that we described in section 2. A failure of  institutional legitimacy
erodes compliance and help-seeking behavior, and this undermines an institution’s trustworthiness
by diminishing its competence with respect to its mandate. The competence of  law enforcement
institutions requires compliant, cooperative subjects. Criminal case closure rates, for example, are
dramatically affected by witnesses’ willingness to come forward with suspect descriptions. The
successful investigation of  domestic battery offenses requires that victims are willing to report those
crimes to police. Thus, when trust is absent, this can erode trustworthiness by eroding the competence
of  law enforcement. In other words, while the attitudes of  those subject to an institution’s authority
are not constitutive of  the institution’s trustworthiness, they are instrumentally important because
they affect behaviors that can, in many cases, hinder the institution’s competence, and thus, a decline
in its trustworthiness.
As we argued above, opaque criminal justice algorithms undermine the ability of  law
enforcement and the courts to signal to citizens that they are competent and responsive to their
needs. For example, an opaque predictive policing system can make it difficult or impossible for a
police department to demonstrate that it is making racially fair choices about where to allocate police
on patrol. In this case, signaling competence and responsiveness requires transparency. This
prospect is especially troubling in light of  the litany of  recent high-profile incidents of  police
brutality and misconduct in the U.S. that have caused a decline in public trust in policing, most
significantly within the Black community. A recent poll found that 48% of  African-Americans report
having very little or no confidence at all in local police to treat Blacks and whites equally; only 12%
of  whites felt the same way (Santhanam 2020). Furthermore, despite the promise of  diminished bias
in policing, the use of  algorithms by law enforcement has also resulted in many troubling instances,
ranging from mistaken facial recognition to harassment and abuse by police officers (Angwin et al.
2016; McGrory and Bedi 2020). The limited empirical research on public attitudes toward criminal
risk assessment algorithms finds that 61% of  Blacks and 49% of  whites believe that these systems
are not fair to people up for parole (Smith 2018). Thus, the continued and increased use of  opaque
algorithmic tools risks fostering a deeper distrust of  law enforcement at a time when its
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trustworthiness is perilously thin. So long as these algorithms remain opaque to those who are
already distrusting of  police officers, the institutional legitimacy of  law enforcement will continue to
erode.
In sum, declining or compromised trustworthiness of  law enforcement is morally
problematic as both a symptom and further cause of  a decline in (descriptive) legitimacy. A decline
in descriptive legitimacy produces socially undesirable outcomes, including lower compliance from
citizens and decreased help-seeking behavior. This can cause crimes to go unreported, a decline in
compliance with the law, and a significant disruption in social order and public safety. Insofar as
algorithmic opacity contributes to these outcomes, it is morally problematic.
5.2 Normative Legitimacy
Descriptive legitimacy, however, cannot be the whole story of  institutional legitimacy: on its own, it
cannot provide the moral ground of  law enforcement institutions’ authority to enforce the laws. A
severely corrupt and unjust state or institution might enjoy descriptive legitimacy if  it secures trust
from the public through deception concerning its motives and operations. A second conception of
legitimacy, popular among philosophers and political theorists, points to a more fundamental
problem with declining trustworthiness. Call this normative legitimacy. An institution’s normative
legitimacy concerns the justification of  its distinctive authority. The question of  normative legitimacy
asks what are the grounds of  an institution’s claim to authority, where authority includes a moral
claim to issue demands to those subject to its authority and to coercively enforce those demands. In
the case of  law enforcement, this authority includes its particular coercive powers, its monopoly on
the use of  force, its broader role in criminal justice, and so on. In contrast to descriptive legitimacy,
an institution’s normative legitimacy is not reducible to the beliefs or judgments of  those subject to
the institution’s authority (though, as we will see, these can sometimes play a role in the overall
justification). Rather, it is rooted in certain objective conditions that justify that authority. When an
institution’s normative legitimacy is diminished or compromised, so is its claim to authority.
Rather than defending any particular view of  normative legitimacy, we will briefly discuss
three general approaches to grounding institutional legitimacy and show how, on each of  them,
trustworthiness is essential for legitimacy. On perhaps the simplest and most straightforward
approach, one might claim that trustworthiness is a constitutive feature of  legitimate
institutions—particularly those, like law enforcement and the courts, that exercise extraordinary
power. That is, part of  what it is for an institution to enjoy a claim to authority--to be justified in the
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exercise of  coercive powers in enforcing its demands--is for it to be competent in the relevant
domain and non-accidentally responsive to the fact that it is counted on by citizens in that domain.
As an institution’s competence or responsiveness declines, so too does its claim to authority; beyond
a certain point, the institution ceases to be legitimate altogether. Again, the teaching analogy is useful
here: if  someone (a) fails to possess the skills needed to assess their students’ work, (b) lacks the
proper motivation to assess their work impartially, or (c) lacks the inclination to signal to students
that one is competent and motivated in the right ways, then one’s claim weakens to be a legitimate
evaluator of  students’ academic work. Possessing these qualities is part of  what itis to enjoy
legitimate authority to judge the merits of  students’ work. Similarly, diminishing trustworthiness
erodes an institution’s claims to (normative) legitimacy. Setting aside whatever harmful consequences
might eventuate, the loss of  constitutive legitimacy poses a moral problem insofar as criminal justice
institutions cannot justifiably issue and coercively enforce demands of  citizens without normative
legitimacy.
A social contract approach to legitimacy can also support the conclusion that
trustworthiness is essential for institutional normative legitimacy. At the risk of  oversimplifying,
social contract theories generally ground institutional (or state) legitimacy in the consent, agreement,
or acceptance of  the authority, whether tacitly or explicitly, by those subject to it. The connection
between consent and trustworthiness is typically only implicit in these discussions; however, it is
made clearest perhaps in the writings of  Thomas Hobbes. Owing to the rampant distrust one finds
in his vision of  the State of  Nature, Hobbes defends the rational shift to life under a sovereign
authority, who is “trusted to judge between man and man” (Hobbes 1968). Though Hobbes does
not use the language of  ‘trustworthiness’, it is natural to read him as holding that one’s placing trust
in this judge is rational only insofar as the judge is trustworthy. Evan Fox-Decent makes this point
when he writes that, on Hobbes’s view, “the office of  the judge is constituted by the judge’s
trustworthiness in relation to his role” (Fox-Decent 2019, p. 11) We understand these passages to be
expressing the claim that the legitimacy of  the state is determined by its trustworthiness, because
rational parties to the social contract would only cede legitimate authority to govern to a trustworthy
state. Parties to the social contract would never agree to cede authority to a state that was not
competent and responsive to the fact that citizens were depending on it for the provision of  certain
vital goods like security in one’s person. Because a state’s competence and responsiveness depend
heavily on the competence and responsiveness of  its key institutions, when state institutions fail to
be trustworthy, so does the state itself.
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According to a third approach to legitimacy, which we will call the comparative feasibility
account,10 some institutions have “morally mandatory” aims. These are aims there is a moral
imperative to promote. Emotional and physical health is a morally mandatory aim of  healthcare
institutions. N.P. Adams has argued that the legitimacy of  an institution with morally mandatory aims
turns on its ability to achieve those aims in comparison with feasible alternatives.11 Whether an
institution of  this sort is legitimate is determined in part by whether there are alternatives that would
better achieve the morally mandatory aims of  the current institution, other things being equal. For
example, N.P. Adams writes,
[A] medical institution in the mid-nineteenth century that did not have any
effective cancer treatments could very well be legitimate: it could have the
right to carry out its tasks, to serve as a cooperative venture with the aim of
providing medical care. If  we transplant that medical institution, with all its
capacities and equipment intact, to our time, it is illegitimate. The only thing
that has changed is that there are now better feasible alternatives because
we know much more and have much better technology (Adams 2020).
When superior feasible alternatives exist that better promote an institution’s morally mandatory aims,
an institution that does not employ them suffers a proportionate erosion of  its legitimacy; in some
cases, failure to employ such alternatives could render the institution illegitimate altogether.
Let us suppose, contrary to the claims of  strict abolitionists, that law enforcement
institutions do have morally mandatory aims, including the protection of  individuals’ rights and the
promotion of  peace, security, and justice. The relevant question for the comparative feasibility
account of  legitimacy, then, is whether the practices of  existing law enforcement institutions are
more effective than feasible alternatives at achieving these aims. As we have already seen, the
increasing reliance on algorithmic technologies, like predictive policing, can erode public trust.
Further, as we noted earlier in our discussion of  descriptive legitimacy, this decline in public trust
frustrates law enforcement’s ability to achieve the aims of  the institution, insofar as public distrust
causes a decline in compliance or help-seeking behavior. Especially against a backdrop of  racial strife
concerning American law enforcement's relationship with black Americans, this decline in law
11 This view applies to institutions with morally required aims as opposed to institutions with merely morally permissible
aims, such as voluntary social groups, or those with morally impermissible aims, such as hate groups.
10 See: (Adams 2020, pp. 300–301) for one articulation of  a view like this, which he attributes to (Pogge 2008, p. 25).
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enforcement competence, caused by the use of  algorithmic systems, makes alternative models of
crime prevention seem more promising in comparison.
Finally, the so-called “public reason” approach to institutional legitimacy has recently seen a
resurgence in the academic literature concerned with algorithmic accountability (Binns 2018).
Accountability is the requirement that, in order for a decision to be legitimate, the institutional
decision-maker must provide adequate justification to those affected by the decision. Public reason
can be useful as a framework for determining what counts as an adequate justification. The concept
of  public reason has its roots in the political philosophy of  Rousseau, Kant, and later John Rawls and
Jurgens Habermas.12 According to the requirement of public reason, legitimate “laws and political
institutions must be justifiable to each of  us by reference to some common point of  view, despite
our deep differences and disagreements”(Quong 2013). The exact scope of  the requirement of
public reason is contested, but it is broadly agreed that it at least acts as a constraint on legitimate
coercion by state institutions. When the public reason requirement is applied to institutional
decision-makers such as police or court officials, it requires that their decisions be justifiable at least
to those affected, but also to the larger citizenry, by appeal to normative and empirical claims that a
reasonable person would accept. Ruben Binns has argued that the requirement of  public reason can
be marshalled to provide a constraint on algorithmic decision-making. He writes, “public reason
could act as a constraint on algorithmic decision-making power by ensuring that decision-makers
must be able to account for their system’s outputs according to epistemic and normative standards
which are acceptable to all reasonable people”(Binns 2018, p. 550). On this account, the legitimacy
of  an institution’s decision-making apparatus is threatened when institutional decision-makers cannot
account for the outputs of  the algorithmic system that informed their decision according to
standards that are acceptable to reasonable people. Does the public reason approach leave any role
for trustworthiness in grounding institutional legitimacy? We think it can. The public reason
approach imposes a constraint on the justifications that the state can avail itself  of  when imposing
coercive measures. One plausible higher order constraint of  public reason is that the
decision-making apparatus of  state institutions must not diminish the trustworthiness of  those
institutions. Any decision issuing from a decision-making apparatus that threatens the institution’s




This essay has identified ways in which the use of  opaque algorithms by criminal justice institutions
undermines the trustworthiness of  criminal justice institutions. It has also identified several moral
problems with a failure of  institutional trustworthiness. To remedy these issues, certain policy
proposals suggest themselves. This section briefly notes some of  the various approaches criminal
justice institutions might take to bolster trustworthiness.
First, those criminal justice institutions deploying algorithmic systems ought to subject these
systems to regular external audits, and those in relevant positions of  oversight (e.g., legislators) ought
to require such audits as a condition of  their use. Algorithmic audits allow an unaffiliated third-party
expert or team of  experts to examine the source code and its recommendations, and identify any
problems (Guszcza et al. 2018). Such audits are typically thought to be an important check against
the possible biases encoded in such systems (Friedler and Diakopoulos 2016; Kim 2017). Allowing
these audits is an important step for both establishing and signaling the competence of  the
institutions that use algorithmic systems.
One obstacle to such audits stems from the proprietary opacity we discussed above. That is,
the companies that produce such algorithmic systems typically retain broad intellectual property
rights that protect them against having to make their source code available for audits or other types
of  inspection. While a concern to foster innovation speaks in favor of  granting companies some
measure of  intellectual property protection, these protections must be curtailed to ensure that
systems used in criminal justice, or in the provision of  other public goods, are able to be audited. In
short, the law and practice here must change. One possibility is to require, by law, that all algorithmic
systems be open for audits by third-parties, while also retaining broad intellectual property rights.
Another possibility is to require by law that public institutions, like courts and police departments,
only purchase and use algorithmic systems that are able to be audited. This would create clear
market incentives for companies making these systems to comply with such audits.
Second, and perhaps surprisingly, police departments can use algorithmic systems to
promote trust by signaling competence and responsiveness to need. For example, researchers
collaborated with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department in 2015 and 2016 to develop a
machine learning model to predict which police officers are at risk for an adverse event involving a
member of  the public (Carton et al. 2016). The model developed by the research team increased true
positives by ~12% and decreased false negatives by ~32% in comparison with the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg PD’s existing Early Intervention System. Equally importantly, the developers
of  the system are transparent about the role that various factors play in generating the system’s risk
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classifications, and its accuracy was robustly tested, not only in terms of  a subset of  its training data,
but in comparison with existing Early Intervention Systems. By helping to develop this system, and
then subsequently implementing it, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department thereby signaled
its responsiveness to the safety concerns of  citizens about interacting with members of  the police
force as well as its competence to address those concerns.
Neither of  these remedies is a panacea. For one thing, the problems with algorithms in
criminal justice extend far beyond the opacity problem we have discussed here. And even with
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